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INTR OD UC TION
Over the past several decades, the US domestic labor force
has experienced a surge in low-wage work, owed partly to the
economic downturns of the late 1980s and 2000s.1 Domestic
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Fordhan University School of Law: B.A., 2006, University
of Pennsylvania. I dedicate this work to the memory of my father, Yeong-Cheng.
1. DAVM AUTOR, THE POLARIZATION OF JOn OPPORTUNITIES IN THE U.S. LABOR
MARKET: IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS, fig. 1 (2010),
http:/,/vow.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/pdf/job polarization pdf
(detailing a surge in low-wage during 1989-99, and then even more so during the
1999-2007 period); HEATHLR BOUSHLY LT AL., UNDERSTANDIN, Low-WA(,E WORK IN
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household services, the segment of service work characterized as
remunerated household-related labor, is one industry that has
been affected by this labor market shift.2 Commonly, individuals
in this sector include cleaners, cooks, housekeepers, and
nannies. The household domestic senvices industry has grown
considerably as a result of this labor market shift, fueled by an
influx of low-wage workers from non-US countries in the
Caribbean, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.4 The trend is
likely to continue.
THE UNITED STATES, fig. 3 (2007), available at http://www.incltusionistorg/files/
lowwagework.pdf (depicting a polarization of low-wage and high-wage work starting in
the 1990s): see also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: VORKING POOR, available at http:// ,w.bls.gov/Cps/
earnings.htrmlvorkpoor (providing yearly historical reports with detailed statistics of
shares of the "working poor" in the Ulnited States since 1996, which refers to
individuals who, despite holding either part-time or full-time work. nevertheless have
resided below the official poverty level for twenty-seven weeks or more during the year).
2. See Laura Dresser, Cleaning and Caring in the Home: Shared Problems? Shared
Possibilities ?, in THE GLOVES OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF
AMERICA'S LABOR MARKET 116 (Annette Bernhardt et al. eds., 2008) (pointing out that
"personal and home care aide employment is projectcd to grow by 41 percent by 2014;
the base of home health aides will expand some 56 percent, making it the fastest-growing
occupation in the economy."); Gordon IH. Hanson et. al., 1mmigraion and the (.S.
Economy: Labor-Market Anpacts, Illegal Entry, and Policy Choices, in IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND THE ILELFARE STATL: A RLPORT FOR THE FONDAZIONE RODOLFO DEBENLDETTI 200,
tbl. 10.4 (Tito Boeri et al. eds., 2002) (noting that household services as the second
fastest-growing industry in California among immigrant workers); INTI LABOUR ORG.,
4 PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION, EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE 01 WOMEN MIGRANT
WORKERS: AN INFORMATION GUIDE 10 [hereinafter PREVENTING DISCRIMI NATION I
(explaining that female migrant workers tend to find work in jobs that "tend to be
extensions of the female traditional role of care giving and housework," in contrast to
male migrant workers who "migrate for a variety of jobs ranging from low to high-
skilled jobs").
3. The terms "household worker" and "domestic worker" are used
interchangeably in this Note. In either case, they refer to workers who work within the
domestic services industry, such as cooks. maids. butlers, and caretakers.
4. Hanson et al., supra note 2. 180 tbl.2.2 (studying the pattern of domestic labor
flows around the world); Peggie Smith, Organizing the Unorganizable: Paid Household
Workers and Approaches to Employee Representation, 79 N.C. L. REv. 45, 52 (2000)
[hereinafter Smith. O-ganizig the Unorganizable] (noting the evolving demographic
composition of domestic workers).
5. See PREVENTING DisC RIMINATION, supra note 2, at 11 ("The demand for women
migrant workers, in particular those going into domestic service, is often high and
sustained, since they represent a form of 'replacement mobility' for female nationals
who are freed from their household and care responsibilities to take up other-
be[tier-positions il the labour market."). See also MEGAN GAYDOS LT AL., A HEALTH
IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILT 889: THE CALJIFORNIA DOMESTIC
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Notably, this group of individuals falls outside the ambit of
several important pieces of legislation that could otherwise offer
them workplace protections.@ For example, the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA"), one of several important laws created
during the New Deal era, protects an employee's right to
collectively bargain with her employer by shielding her from
certain workplace practices intended to discourage or handicap
bargaining activity.7 However, domestic workers are not similarly
protected.8 As a result, they are left with a veritable handicap
should they attempt to voice their concerns regarding the
employer-employee relationship.
This Note focuses on the development of the US domestic
services industry and examines the reasons for this legislative
exclusion. Consequently, this Note is largely an historical inquiry
that seeks to understand the context for the exemption and
questions the legitimacy of its continued exclusion. Part I
explores the unique challenges that the domestic services
industry faces, and it discusses the range of legislative
protections-both domestic and international-that are
potentially available to address them. Part II details the historical
pedigree that influenced the current state of legislative
protections for the industry in the United States. Finally, Part III
argues that existing reasons to uphold these legislative
exclusions are both inadequate and anachronistic.
I. A LEGISLATIVE VACUUM
Domestic workers face notable challenges within the
workplace, unlike any other group of workers in the United
wORK EMPiOYFF EQU ALIFY, FAIRNESS, AND DIGNiTY ACT oF 2011, 27 (2011) (explaining
that current issues facing domestic workers will grow as immigration trends continue).
6. As this Note discusses further in Part .C, significant New Deal Era legislation
such as the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)), the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. 201-219 (2006), and the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151-169
(2006), all excluded domestic workers.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 151-169.
8. Id. § 152(3) (explaining that the term, "employee" does not include
independent contractors, agricultural or domestic workers, employees hired by a
parent or spouse, managers, and workers already covered by the Railway Labor Act).
9. See infra Part I.C (explaining the handicap domestic workers face withou[ these
legislative protections).
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States."o Part LA provides an overview of the industry and notes
that domestic workers stand in a unique position that render
them particularly vulnerable relative to other groups of service
workers. Next, Part I.B discusses international labor protections
available to domestic workers. Finally, Part LC details relevant
legislation in the United States, including a detailed discussion
of the domestic worker exclusion within the NLRA.
A. "The lowest rung of legitimate employment'l
Historically, domestic work in the United States has been
the employ of the poor and the disenfranchised.'1 Owing in
large part to the nature of the job, it has never occupied a
coveted position within the American social hierarchy." Not
only did domestic workers mop floors and clean toilets, but they
were also expected to dedicate a significant portion of their time
in doing so.' 4 Sociologist Lewis Coser pointed out a growing
trend during the New Deal era, where the responsibilities for
jobs of similar work required a near-total commitment from the
worker herself. 15 Dubbed "greedy institutions," these
occupations were those that did not "rest content with claiming
a segment of the time, commitment, and energy of the servant,"
10. See infra Part LA (detailing the unique circunstances that domestic workers
face).
11. EvEiY NAKANO GLENN, ISSEI, NTSET, WAR 11RIDE: THREE GENERATIONS OF
JAPANLSE AMERICAN WOMEN IN DOMESTIC SERVICE 165 (1986) (Citation omitted).
12. Peggie R. Smith, Regulating Paid Household 1Work: Class, Gende, Race, and
Agendas of Reform 48 AM. U. L. REV. 851, 854-55 (1999) [hereinafter Smith, Regulating
Paid Household Work] (describing the historical roots of domestic work in the United
States); see generally Nancy Z. Byrd, The Dirty Side of Domestic Work: An Underground
Economy and the Exploitation of Undocumented Workers. 3 DEPA -L . FOR SOC. jUST. 245
(2010) (noting the historical pedigree of modern domestic workers).
13. See GLENN, supra note 11, at 146 (citation omitted) (describing the historical
roots of domestic work in the United States); see also Byrd, supra note 12, at 260 (2010)
(noting the historical pedigree of modern domestic workers).
14. See DOMESTIC WORKERS UNITED & DATACENTER, -IONIE IS WHERE THE WORK
IS: INSIDE NEW YORK's DOMESTIC WORK INDUSTRY 15 (2006) [hereinafter HOME IS
WHERE THE IWORK IS]. available at http://w.datacentcier.org/reports/
horneiswheretheworkis.pdf (explaining that half of all workers who work overtime work
more than fifty to sixty hours a week).
15. See Lewis A. Coser, Servants: The Obsolescence of an Occupational Role, 52 SOC.
FORCES 31, 32 (1973).
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but instead demanded "full-time allegiance."b This is as true
today as it was nearly a hundred years ago, when the enactment
of such important New Deal legislation, like the NLRA, afforded
new and unprecedented protections for US workers.
Across the United States, ninety-five percent of the
estimated 1.8 million domestic workers are women, are not born
in the United States, or are persons of color. When narrowed
to specific geographic areas within the country, this proportion
becomes even more stratified.8 For instance, in New York City,
ninety-three percent of the estimated 200,000 domestic workers
are women,' but ninety-five percent are racial minorities, and
ninety-nine percent are from countries other than the United
States.2 1 An extensive study in San Francisco reflects this trend as
well, finding that ninety-nine percent of domestic workers were
non-American immigrant workers2 Ninety-four percent of this
portion were Latina, and all but two percent of the domestic
worker population was female.2 The trend repeats itself in other
areas of the country like Chicago and Los Angeles. 23
16. See id.; see also Erna Magnus, The Social, Economic, and Legal Conditions of
Domestic Servants, 30 INT'T LAB. REV. 190, 196 (1934) (" [T]he duties of a [live-in]
scivant arei indefinite.").
17. See HOME IS WHERE THE WORK IS, supra note 14, at 10 (describing a
disproportionate representation of minorities and women within the industry);
ANDOiLAN ORG. S. ASIAN WORKERS ET AL., DOMESTIC WORKERS' RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE IN RESPONSE TO
THE SECOND AN) THIRD PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (2005), available at
http://wwwaw.untc.edu/documents/clinicalprograms/(omesticw\iorkersreport.pdf
(suimmarizing general statistics about the domestic worker industry in the United
States).
18. See HOME IS WHERE THE WORK IS, supra note 14 (surveying domestic workers
in New York City); see also GAYDOS ET AL., supra not 5, at 29 (surveying domestc
workers in San Francisco).
19. HOME IS WHERE THE WORK IS, supra note 14, at 1-2 (presenting findings on
an extensive survey of New York City domestic workers).
20. See id. at 10 (describing the demographic composition of New York City
domestic workers).
21. See GAYDOS LT AL., supra note 5, at 29 (illustrating the demographic trend of
domestic workers in San Francisco, California).
22. Id. (noting that domestic workers in San Francisco are disproportionately
female minoritics).
23. See EXCLUDED WORKERS CONG., UNITY FOR DIGNITY: EXPANDING THE RIGHT
TO ORGANIZE TO WIN HUNAN RIGHTS AT WORK 18 (2010) [hereinafter UNITY FOR
DIGNITY] (comparing similar findings among different citics); see also ILAUREN D.
APPEiBAUM, UCLA INST. FOR RESEARCH ON LABOR AND EMP'T, WHY A DOMESTIC
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Importantly, however, this distribution reflects the pattern
around the world, as scholars and advocates estimate that close
to 100 million women and young girls earn their living through
some form of domestic work.
What more, the employers who typically hire domestic
workers seldom adhere to lawful labor practices.25 A survey
conducted throughout New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles
found that forty-one percent of domestic workers were not paid
the minimum wage, as required by state and federal law.26
Eighty-three percent of home health care workers and ninety
percent of child care workers worked past the standard work
week without overtime compensation.27 The yearly earnings for
every one of four domestic workers in New York City were not
enough to meet the poverty line.28
WORKERS BILL OF RIGHTS? 6-7 (2010) (comparing New York and California
legislation).
24. INT'L LABOUR ORG., GLOBAL AND REGTONAL ESTIMATES ON DOMESTIC
WORKERS 6 (2011) (estimating the global population of domestic workers); Press
Release, Int'l Labour Org., 100th ILO Annual Conference Decides to Bring an
Estimated 53 to 100 Million Domcstic Workers Worldwide Under the Realm of Labour
Standards (June 16. 2011) [hereinafter 1LO Press Release] (introducing the June 2011
International Labour Organization ("11.") Domestic Worker Convention that covers
workers worldwide).
25. See N.Y. DLP'T OF LABOR, FEASIBILITY OF DOMESTIC WORKER COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 15 (2010) [hereinafter FEASIBLITY STUDY], available at
http://www.labor.iny.gov/legal/laws/pdf/doiestic-orkers/Idomestic-iorkers-
feasibility-study.pdf (" [M] any individuals who employ domestic workers are ambivalent
about their role as the employer .. "); see also UNITYFOR DIGNITY, supra note 23, at 24
(2010) (noting the pervasiveness of employer abuses within the industr y); see generally
DOMESTIC WORKERS UNITED ET AL.. DOMESTIC VORKERS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
A PROPOSAL. FOR IMMEDIATE INCLUSION IN THE NEWYORK STATE LABOR RELATIONs XcT
6 (2010) [hereinafter DOMESTIC WORKERS AND COI ECTIVE BARGAINING], avalable at
http: //www.domesticworkers.org/ sitcs/ default /filcs/pdfs/collcctive bargaining.pdf
(documenting incidents of employer abuses).
26. ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS:
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMLRICA'S CITIES (2009)
(highlighting the results of a comprehensive survey that found systematic trends among
major citics where employers were violating basic wage and hour laws).
27. Id. at 34 (noting that violations of overdine laws are also common
occurrence); CLAMRE 1-IOBDEN, INT'l IABOLR ORG., WINNING FAIR LABOUR STANDARDS
FOR DOMESTIC WORKERS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CAMPAIGN FOR A DOMESTIC
WORKER BILL OF RIHTS IN NEW YORK STATE 8 (2010), available at
http://www.ilo.org/actrav/what/pubs/W(MS_149488/lang-en/index.htm.
28. See HOME ISWHLRL THE WORKIS, supra note 14, at 15-18 (summarizing wages
for domestic workers in New York City); see also DOMESTIC WORKERS AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING, supra note 25, at 5 (providing data on domestic worker wages).
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Employer abuses in the industry are common because
safeguards like grievance procedures, review committees, and
appeals boards do not exist within a household. " Reports
indicate that one-third of the 15,000 to 20,000 annual victims of
labor trafficking in the United States are domestic workers.s0
Oftentimes, the only options for a worker in that position are to
either accept the abuse or quit altogether.1 Labor scholars have
described this as modern day institutionalized slavery that, in
unregulated corners of the world, can bear little discernible
distinction between legitimate employment and servitude.
Domestic workers' experiences in the United States are part
and parcel of a global narrative." The International Labour
Organization ("ILO"), the United Nations agency tasked to
oversee international labor issues, reports a shifting trend in
29. See FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 25, at 15-16 (describing the limited means
through which domestic workers can address employer abuses); Aiden Poo & E.
Tammy Kim, Organizing to Transform Ourselves and Our Laws: The New York Donestic
Workers Bill of Rights Campaign, 44 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 577 (2011) (summarizing
difficulties for domestic workers due to the private nature of their workplace).
30. U.S. DEPT. OF HEAILTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET Al., THE FUTURE SUPPLY OF LONG-
TERM CARE WORKERS IN RELATION TO THE AGING BABY 1100M GENERATION 38 (2003),
available at http: /aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reportsltcwork.pdf (describing the prevalence
of abuse within the household ser ies industry); Paul Vitello, From Stand in Long Island
Slavery Case, a Snapshot of a Hidden US.. Problem. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2008, at lIl
( reporting the account of one New York couple that faced criminal charges for their
abuse of two domestic workers and lurther noting widespread issue of abuse of
domestic workers). Primarily due to the private nature of the work environment,
reliable statistics that shed light on the incidence of abuses in the domestic worker
industry are difficult to obtain. See UNITYFOR DIGNITY, supra note 23, at 18 (explaining
that accurate statistics on the industry are difficult to obtain due to the nature of work
in the household scrvices industry); see generalivJos6 Maria Ramirez-Machado, Domestic
Work. Conditions of Work and Employment: A Legal Perspetive (Int'l Labour Org. Working
Paper) available at http://ww.ilo.org/travail/whatwedo/publications/
W(MSTRAVAILPUB_7/lang-en/index.htmi (noting that estinates of the industry
are difficult to determine due to the lack of data).
31. See FEASIBIL.ITYSTUDY, supra note 25, at 16 (explaining that limited means of
redress often leave workers with no choice but to quit their jobs altogether); see also Poo
& Kim, supra note 29, at 578-79 (describing instances in which domestic workers were
fired or forced to quit); DOMESTIC WORKERS AND COiLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note
25, at 70 (sunimarizing the "insecurity and instability of domestic emuployment").
32. See generally Byrd, supra note 12 (explaining the inadequate regulation to
prevent abuse against domestic workers).
33. ADELLE BLACKETT. MAKING DOMESTIC WORK VISIBLE: THE CASE FOR SPECIFIC
REGULATION 22 (1998) (comparing patterns of domestic worker treatment across
countries); Donna E. Young, Working Across Borders: Global Restructuring and Women s
Work 2001 UTAH L. REV. 1, 27 (2001) (describing abuses against domestic workers in
non-US countries).
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female migrant labor where, increasingly, women are migrating
not to join their partners, but instead for better employment
opportunities otherwise unavailable in their home countries. 4
To facilitate their passage, there has been a proliferation of
illegal and unlicensed employment recruiters that operate in the
shadows of regulated labor practices. 35 Incidents of labor
trafficking are common among these recruiters, who exploit
unsuspecting female migrants seeking employment abroad. 6
This is significant because domestic workers, in particular,
comprise the largest group of female migrant workers.37
In Malaysia, for example, some employment recruiters
explicitly advise employers to retain the worker's passport and to
forbid them "to talk or converse with others, walk alone, open
the door to anyone, especially when they are alone in the
house." 3 The onus for enforcing workers' employment
contracts falls on both the domestic worker and the employer3
Employers hiring domestic help must place a monetary security
bond to guarantee the worker's labor permit.40 That bond is
forfeited in the event that the worker leaves the emploer. 4 1
Consequently, the bond "can have the effect of encouraging
employers who do not want to lose their money to place heavier
restrictions on the personal freedoms of migrant domestic
workers." These restrictions include confining the worker to
34. See INT'L LABOUR ORG., I PREVENTING DISCRIM[NATION, EXPiLOTATION AND
ABUSF OF WOMEN MIGRANT WORKERS: AN INFORMATION GUIDF 10 (pointing to the
growing trend of female migrants around the world).
35. See INTI LABOUR ORG., 3 PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION, EXPILOITATION AND)
ABU F OF WOMEN MIGRANT WORKERS: AN INFORMATION GUIDE 12 (noting a growth of
illegal recruiters, often as a result of restrictive, complicated, time consuming, or costly
procedures involved in legal labor recruitment).
36. Id. at 17-18 (remarking on the high incidence of abuse associated with
unregulated employment agencies).
37. See PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 11 (pointing out that
"domestic work is the single largest employment category for wonien imigrants").
38. Id. at 26-27 (citations omitted).
39. See id. at 26 (noting that employers must post a security bond to "serve as a
deterrent so that, migrant workers do not abscond on their employment contracts").
40. See id. (noting that in Singapore, the bond is SGDS5,000. and is RMS500 in
Malaysia).
41. Id. at 13 (identifying discriminatory employer conduct through mandatory
pregnancy testing).
42. Id. at 26.
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the home, and giving her little rest to minimize the opportunity
she can have to communicate with othersi4
Employers in Japan and South Korea likewise institute
pseudo-importation schemes to circumvent domestic laws that
set workplace standards for pay, hours, and benefits. 44 The
practice largely revolves around labeling foreign domestic
workers as "trainees," rather than as bona fide employees, in
order to exploit a loophole in labor laws that would otherwise
require employers to adhere to higher labor standards.45 As a
trainee, the average foreign domestic worker in South Korea
receives sixty to seventy percent less pay than a similarly situated
South Korean citizen. 4 She also does not receive any
compensation for overtime work.47
Most notably, employment is often brokered through an
"onward managing agency," a middle man that periodically
takes a portion of the worker's earnings as exchange for its
services in securing her employment.4 These countries join an
international community that explicitly excludes domestic
workers from respective national legislation-countries that
include, but are not limited to, Costa Rica, Croatia, Grenada,
Norway, Japan, Jordan, Korea, and Malaysia.49 That the United
States also suffers from shortcomings for domestic workers
protections is symptomatic of a global norm.
B. International Protections
Several important international treaties address workplace
protections for domestic workers, and, in theory, place a floor
43. Id. at 26-27.
44. See id. at 34 (explaining kgislation in Japan and South Korea); see generally
PEGGTE WY. LEE & CAROIEJ. PETERSEN, UNIV. OF HK. CTR. FOR COMPARATIVE & PUB.
LAW, FORCED LABOUR AND DEBT BONDAGE IN HONG KONG: A STUDY OF INDONESIAN
AND FILIPINA MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS (2006), available at http://www.1aw.hku.hk
/ccpl/pib/l)ocumnents/16-LeeI'etersen.pdf (describing abusive fee structures in
employment agencies).
45. See PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 34 (explaining that Japancsc
law, for example, undermines protections for domestic workers).
46. Id. (noting that discriminatory labor laws Icad to significant wage disparities
between foreign domestic workers and host country nationals).
47. Id. (noting that overtime compensation is a rarity).
48. Id. (explaining that employment agencies exaccrbate the vulnerabilities
domestic workers face).
49. Id. at 12.
20131 A GREEDY INSTITUTION 715
on permissible employer conduct.5 1o Part I.B.1 discusses the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR,"
or the "Covenant") and how it relates to the state of domestic
worker protections in the United States. 5' Part I.B.2 then
discusses the Convention Concerning Decent Work for
Domestic Workers ("Domestic Worker Convention," or the
"Convention") and addresses what the new Convention would
mean for domestic workers.5 2
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICCPR Article 2 obligates States to undertake steps
"necessary to give effect to the rights" to assemble and
associate." Under this understanding, labor practices within the
United States not only run counter to Article 2, but also Articles
21 and 22 because carve-outs within the NLRA deliberately
exempt domestic workers from unionizing protections. 4 Among
other things, Article 2 obligates State parties to legislate where
necessary, to give full effect to the rights recognized within the
Covenant.55 It also obligates State parties to protect those rights
50. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Mar. 23. 1976) [hereinafter 1((PR]; Int'l
Labour Org., Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, June 16,
2011, 100 ILO (189 [hereinafter Domestic Worker Convention], available at
http: //www.ilo.org/ilc/IL( Sessions/ 100 thSession/rep orts/provisional-
records/W(MS_157836/lang-en/index.hti.
51. See infra Part l.. I
52. See inr Part I.B.2.
53. See I((PR, supra note 50, art. 2(1) ("[E]ach State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals . . . the rights
recognized in the present Covenant . . . ."); see also id. art. 2(2) ("[E]ach State Party to
the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps ... to adopt such laws or
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the
present Covenant.").
54. See id. art. 21 ("The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No
restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in
conformity with the law and which are necessary . . . in the interests of national
security[,] . .. safety, public order[,] . . . health[.] morals[, and] the . . . rights and
freedoms of others."); see also id. art. 22(1) ("Everyone shall have the right to freedom
of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the
protection of his interests."); id. art. 22(2) ("No restrictions may be placed on the
exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are
necessary . . . in the interests of national security[,]. . .. safety, public order[, . . .
hcaltlh[,] morals[, and] the ... rights and frecdoms of others.").
55. Id. art. 2(2).
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"without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status."56 The Covenant goes on
to enumerate specific rights, such as of peaceful assembly
(Article 21) and freedom of association (Article 22).5 The
Human Rights Committee, the UN body that monitors the
ICCPR's implementation, has interpreted similar language in
other treaties as obligating the State to take both affirmative and
negative actions toward protecting those enumerated rights.58
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights interpreted the
scope of the right to peaceful assembly and the right to freely
associate broadly, as including trade unions within their
contexts. *
But though particular ICCPR violations may well occur
within the United States, a consequent problem remains with
enforcement. The United States has placed a declaration on the
Covenant restricting its enforceability within the domestic
sphere.6o Because the treaty is not self-executing, an employer
found in violation of any of its provisions would not be subject to
jurisdiction in any US court.61 For the same reason, the ICCPR
does not create an automatic private cause of action on behalf of
domestic workers who are denied associational rights, or any
other rights enumerated within the ICCPR.62 Consequently, the
ICCPR is a strong instrument with enforceable provisions in the
56. Id. art. 2(1).
57. Id. arts. 21, 22.
58. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 03: Implementation at the
national level (Art. 2) (July 7, 1981), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 4 (1994) (noting that parties to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("I(PR") are obligated to fulfill the terins of the treaty,
particularly because "constitutional or legislative enactments . . . in themselves are
often not per se sufficient").
59. See, e.g., Sidiropoulos v. Greece, App. No. 26695/95. 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 633
(1998); United Communist Party of Turk. v. Turk., App. No. 19392/92, 26 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 121 (1998) (interprting the rights under international instruments as including
protections to collectively bargain).
60. 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-84, art. III (daily ed. April 2, 1992).
61. Id. (recognizing that international treatics are not domestically binding unlcss
the declaration from execution is removed). Treatics that are sclf-executing are those
that are automatically enforceable in the domestic context. In practice, however,
almost all modern treatics in the United States include declarations that prevent self-
execution.
62. Id. (recognizing that the ICCPR is not self-executing).
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international arena, but the existence of non-self-executing
provisions plagues its enforcement within US courts.63
2. Convention Concerning Decent Work
for Domestic Workers
Discussed above, domestic workers around the world share
many of the same traits as do domestic workers in the United
States. 64 In June 2011, the ILO adopted the Convention
Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers,65 a historic set
of international standards intended to place a floor on
minimum working conditions for millions of domestic workers
worldwide.6@ Though official estimates place the number of
global domestic workers at 53 million, the prevalence of
undocumented workers engaged in informal labor economies
raises that estimate closer to nearly twice that, 100 million.67 In
some developing countries, the concentration of domestic
workers within the workforce can be significant, where nearly
twelve percent of all workers work within a household in one
form or another.68 Estimates suggest that over half of domestic
workers worldwide do not work with maximum weekly hour
limits; forty-five percent are not given any time off during the
week; and over a third of female workers have no legal
entitlements to maternity leave.u9
63. See id. (explaining the limitations associated wvith enforcing ICCPR
provisions).
64. See supra Part I.A.
65. About the Ofice, INT'T LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org,/wvashington/about-
thc-office/Lang-en/index.hun ("The primary goal of the ILO today is to promote
opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and productive work. in conditions
of freedom, equity, security and human dignity")
66. Domestic Worker Convention, supra note 50. Notably, the International
Labour Organization ("ILO") estimates that four out of every five domestic workers in
the world are female. See ILO press Release, supra note 24 (describing the demographic
characteristics of domestic workers worldwide).
67. See ILO Press Rcease, supra note 24 (noting that current estimates are limited,
and are likely under-representations of the true figure).
68. Id. (noting the disparity in developing countries).
69. Questions and Answers on the Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic
Workers, INT'l. LABOUR ORG. (June 21, 2011), http://wNy.ilo.org/ilc/IL(Sessions/
10thSession/eicdia-centre/articles/W(MS_158371 Lang-cn/indcex.ht
(acknowledging that where domestic workers are common, oftentimes. compensation
is extremely limited).
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The Convention aims to correct these disparities. For
instance, countries that ratify the Convention are obligated to
enforce employment contracts to specify certain wage and hour
restrictions on a domestic worker's labor.70 If, in a particular
country, a minimum wage exists for other low-wage workers
generally, the Convention requires that wage floor to apply for
households hiring domestic workers also. 1 Additionally, the
Convention limits the maximum hours of work per day, enacts
new protections against child labor practices, and obligates
Convention parties to create appropriate enforcement
mechanisms. 72 Country delegates at the June 2011 ILO
conference voted in favor of the Convention, passing it with 396
votes in favor, and 16 votes against, sending a strong global voice
in support of these measures.73
Both of these international treaties-the ICCPR and the
Domestic Worker Convention-offer opportunities to increase
labor protections to domestic workers. At a minimum, they
evidence a strong international push to recognize the need to
address problems in a growing segment of low-wage work. Of
course, national governments still hold considerable discretion
in deciding how to approach those problems in accordance with
the methods they see fit. But, these treaties lend valuable
guidance to governments in informing them of the prevailing
labor standards within international community.
C. A Legislative V acuum
While domestic workers in the United States comprise a
substantial portion of the low-wage services sector, the US
legislature has been slow to afford them the same protections it
does to other occupations. Given the unique position of this
70. Domestic Worker Convention, supra note 50 (noting that the convention
would be binding upon ratifying parties).
71. Id. art. 11 (specifying the relevant wage floor).
72. Id. art. 4 (prohibiting child labor); id. art. 10 (restricting working hours); id.
art. 17 (noting further than domestic laws within the country would have to be
realigned with the aims of the treaty).
73. See ILO Press Relcase, supra note 24 (noting the overwhelming support that
states have given in support of the Convention); Hui Min Neo, ILO Passes Landmark
Treat to Protect Domestic Workers, INQUIRER GLOBAL NATION (La Paz, Philippines) (June
16, 2011), hLp://globalnationi.iquircr.net1/4318/ilo-passes-landiiiark-treaty-to-protCct-
donestic-wvorkers.
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group of workers, one might expect that Congress would be
receptive to regulate against abuses in much the same way it has
to prevent child labor, set minimum wages, and legislate
workplace discrimination. 74 In fact, though, legislative
movement toward greater equality on this front has been nearly
non-existent. T This Part details the absence of legislative
protection in this area.
The New Deal era of the mid-1930s was arguably the most
transformative period for labor rights in the United States.76
Growing alarm over the Great Depression, a period of extreme
economic turmoil within the United States, spurred Congress to
enact legislation to stave off economic collapse.7 As part of the
national plan, Congress was quick to enact legislation to bolster
workplace protections for laborers like steel, telephone, and
textile workers.78
Importantly, however, these pieces of legislation all
excluded certain groups of workers from their coverage.7 9 Some
of these groups included railroad and airline workers,
74. See. e.g:, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (2006) (prohibiting child labor); 29 U.S.C. § 206
(sctting a minimum wage).
75. Catherine B. Allen, Legislation for Household W1orkers, in FATR AND CLEAR IN THE
HOMiE 56, 58-59 (Carol Hiba & Dorothy P'. Wells eds., 1936) (noting the sparse
legislation for domestic workers in the United States); AMERICAN RIGHTS AT WORK THE
HAVES AND THE HAVE-NOTS: How AMERICAN LABOR LAW DENTES A QUARTER OF THE
WORKFORCE COLLECTIVE, BARGAINING RIGHTS 2 (2008) [hereinafter THE HA1AVES AND
THE HAVL-NOTS], available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/didocuients/
ARAW\ Reports/hav esandhavenots niracoverage.pdf (describing that legislation
protecting domestic workers is minimal).
76. See Scott D. Miller, Revitalizing the FLSA. 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1. 2
(200 1) (describing legislation during the New Deal); Smith, Regulating Paid Household
Work. supra note 12, at 885-89 (recounting the rapid reforms during the New Deal); see
generally Michael E. Parrish, The Great Depression, the New Deal, and the American Legal
Order, 59 WASH. L. REV. 723 (1984) (describing rapid transformations in labor-related
legisation during the New Deal cra). The New Deal cra refers to the period during the
mid-1930's in the United States, and is marked by a brief period of sweeping
Congressional action that, among other things, conferred signiicant labor protections
to workers. See id. at 736.
77. See Miller, supra note 76, at 23 (identifying particular New Deal lkgislation);
Parrish, supra note 76, at 731-22 (discussing the urgency in passing New Deal
legislation in light of the United States' cconomic circumstances); Smith, Regulating
Paid Household Work, supra note 12, at 887 (describing the purposes of New Deal
legislation).
78. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151-169 (2006); Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-219 (2006).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
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independent contractors, and, notably here, domestic workers."8 1
In 1933, Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act
("NIRA") to regulate market standards and promote fair
competition when securing both minimum wages and maximum
working hours among different industries.?' Two years later, it
passed the Social Security Act ("SSA"), the precursor to the
system of social welfare and insurance programs in place in the
United States today.82 In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor
Standards Act ("FLSA") to set a national minimum wage and to
mandate elevated wage rates for overtime hours.8 As originally
passed, none of these pieces of legislation included domestic
workers in its purview.,4
Notably, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") in 1935 to confer protections on workers engaging in
collective bargaining and unionizing activity."8 The ability to
form unions was a powerful tool for workers who were unable to
successfully lobby their employers for greater workplace benefits
and protections on their own. The US labor union movement
granted millions of workers such benefits as federal anti-
discrimination laws and employee health insurance coverage.8
The federal statute offered a vehicle through which individual
80. Id.
81. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(ruling that Titic I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, formerly codified at 15
U.S.C. 703 (1933), was unconstitutional).
82. The Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
83. 29 U.S.C. 206.
84. Though Congress would later amend the Fair Labor Standards Act to include
domestic workers, that change did not comie until forty years after its original
enactment. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments Act, Pub. L. No.93-259, § 9(b) (1).
2(b) (1) 88 Stat. 6'3 69 (amended 1974).
85. 29 U.S.C. 151-169.
86. See LAWRENCE MISHEL & MATTHE WALTERS. ECON. POL'Y INST.. How
UNIONS HiELP AL WORKERS 2 (2003), available at http://www.epi.org/page/-
/old/ bricfingpapers/143/bp143.pdf (enumerating the benefits from workers' abilities
to unionize); see generally Richard B. Freeman, LongitudinalAnalyses of the Effects of Trade
Unionism, 2 j. LAB. ECON. 1 (1984) (explaining the eflect of unions on the labor
economy).
87. See generall David S. Lee & Alexandre Mas, Long-Run pacts of Uions on
Firms: New Evidencefrom Fin an cial Marke , 1961-1999 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14709, 2008) (identifying several labor imaiket benefits that have
arisen from increased unionization protections); see also Freeman, supra note 86, at 20
(explaining the effect of unionization on the domestic labor market).
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workers were allowed a seat at the bargaining table, giving them
the opportunity, then, to voice their concerns regarding the
employer-employee relationship.88
Like the many landmark pieces of legislation passed during
the New Deal era, however, the NLRA also excluded domestic
workers from its purview.89 This legislative exclusion gave the
employer wide latitude when responding to a domestic worker
who asserted her right to organize for better wages or overtime
compensation. 9 For example, the exclusion permitted an
employer to terminate a domestic worker, even if done in direct
retaliation for participating in union activity 9 As a result, the
exclusion effectively took away the domestic worker's right to
unionize because without these protections, the cost of
unionizing was far too high.9 Consequently, exclusion had the
effect of disincentivizing workers from voicing their protest over
inadequate standards and protections in the workplace.9
Today, federal workplace protections for domestic workers
remain meager.94 FLSA, for example, had initially written out
88. See Mishel & Walters, supra note 86, at 11 (describing the immediate purpose
of workers' unionizing rights).
89. 29 U.S.C. 152(3).
90. See 29 U.S.C. 151-169.
91. Id. (offering legislative protection only for individuals who fall within the
ambit of the statute). State statues have followed the example set by the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") and excluded domestic workers from coverage within
unionizadtion provisions. See DOMESTIC WORKERS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING supra
note 25, at 3 (noting, for example, that the New York state statute "protects workers'
right to collectively bargain with their employers and prohibits employers from
engaging in 'unfair labor practiccs, such as interfering with unionization, blacklisting,
or monitoring workers who organize together," but that domestic workers are currently
excluded).
92. See DOMESTIC WORKERS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 25, at 8
(quoting an employer as explaining that there was no discussion of benefits because
"there [was] a lot of fear. [The domestic worker did not] want to lose the job, and
there [was] a lot of anxiety").
93. See Lee & Mas, supra note 87 (explaining that workers without legislative
protections for unionizing activity are less inclined to assert their rights against
employers); see also Freeman, supra note 86 (describing how a lkgislative absence
disincentivizes workers from reporting employer abuses).
94. See Allen, supra note 75, at 58-59 (noting that since states often follow the
language in federal statutes, state legislation protecting domestic workers' rights are
equally lacking). Though state legislatures are able to create their own laws to fill the
gaps left in the NLRA, many choose not to do so. Instead, states often mirror the
language in the NLRA and consequently deny domestic workers both state and local
fora to litigate an employer's uncompetitive, union-hostile conduct. See RONNIE
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domestic workers from its coverage by using the same language
that was used in the NLRA.95 Though it was amended in 1974,
the statute continues to exclude large portions of the domestic
worker industry.96 This comes mostly from FLSA's outdated
"companionship" exemption that excludes domestic workers
who provide companionship services to individuals who are
unable to care for themselves) 7 The Occupational Safety Health
Act, a landmark piece of legislation that set federal standards for
health and workplace safety in the federal government and the
private sector, similarly excludes domestic workers entirely from
its purview, " [a] s a matter of policy. "' Lastly, domestic workers
are excluded from federal civil rights laws, like Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act." These laws only
cover businesses that employ a certain minimum number of
employees. 00 Because very few household employers meet these
jurisdictional minimums, they are rarely considered employers
for the purposes of these civil rights statutes.1o'
Domestic workers remain excluded from the NLRA even
now, nearly eighty years later. 102 Under current laws, for
instance, attempts to unionize not only run the risk of losing a
job, but often also mean losing hope for permanent immigrant
STEINBERG, WAGES AN) HOURS: LABOR AND REFORM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
95-106 (1982) (explaining that state protections are equally lacking because the
language in state statutes typically mirror the language in federal statutes).
9. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201-219 (2006).
96. Fair Labor Standards Amendments, Pub. L. No.93-259, 9(b) (1), 2s(b) (1),
88 Stat. 6'3 69 ( amended 1974).
97. 29 U.S.C. 213(1) (13). Live-in domestic workers who physically reside within
the home of their household employers are not allowed overtime pay for any hours
worked over forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C. 213 (b) (12).
98. 29 C.F.R. § 19.75.6 (2012).
99. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 12101-
12213 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (2006).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (noting that for the Americans with
Disabilities Act to apply, an employer must have at least fifteen or more employees, and
further noting that the minimum number of employees is twenty or more for the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act to apply).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
102. See supra note 90 (limiting coverage only to those individuals enumerated
within the ambit of the statute); see also FLASIBLITY STUDY, supra note 25, at 3
(highlighting the importance of collective bargaining proltetLions, as in the case of the
New York State Labor Relations Act).
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status within the United States."os Given this, a domestic worker
may well be less willing to voice her right to unionize. 104
The NLRA excludes domestic workers from its protections
primarily in two ways. First, it does so explicitly within its
statutory language.10 Its definition of "employee" excludes "any
individual . . . in the domestic service of any family or person at
his home." 100 Second, the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB"), the federal agency created by the NLRA to enforce
the statute, excludes domestic workers by enforcing the NLRA's
purview discretionally. 07 Though it does not place a
jurisdictional minimum on the number of employees that an
employer must have-as does the FLSA or OSHA-it does limit
its power only to "cases involving enterprises whose effect on
commerce is substantial." 108 Household employers who hire
103. Relatedly, another concern is losing remittances to family members back
home. In 2008, estimates placed the flow of remittances worldwide at USS338 billion,
although "the true size of flows, including unrecorded flows ... is even higher." DIIP
RATHA, SANKET MOHAPATIRA & ANI STLWNAL, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCE TRENDS 2009:
A BLTTLR-THAN-EXPLCTED OUTCOME So FAR, BUT SIGNIFICANT RISKS AHEAD 1 (2009),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1110315015165/MigrationAndDevelopmcntBLricfll.pdf. In fact, so substantial are
remittances to the national economy of some countries that those national
governments encourage workers to move abroad to developed nations for the purpose
of sending remittances back home. See, e.g., RHACEL SALAZAR PARRENAS, THE FORCE OF
DOMESTICITY: FILIPINA MIGRANTS AND GLOBALIZATION 2 (2008) (explaining that Sri
Lanka, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam "promote the labor migration of
women").
104. See infira Part III (detailing the consequences of this legislative absence for
domestic workers).
105. 29 U.S.C. 152(3) (2006) (specifying the types of workers covered under thc
NLRA).
106. Id.
107. NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS 1BD., A GUIDE TO BASIC LAW AND PROCEDURES
UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RLLATIONS ACT 54 (1997) [hereinafter NLRA GUIDE]
(noting discretionary jurisdictional limitations present in NLRA enforcement). Under
this refined definition, thc National Labor Relations Board places a jurisdictional
amount on cnurincated commercial bodies such as, to name a few, nonrctail businesses
with sales of at least US$50,000, office buildings with annual revenues of over
USS100,000, retail enterprises with annual revenues of at Icast, US$500,000, and public
utilities with at least USS250.000 in total annual revenue. See id. at 54: see also
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RLLATIONS ACT BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFTAIRS (Patrick Hardin ct al., eds., 1992)
[hereinafter DEVELOPING LABOR LAw] (describing the set amounts).
108. See NI RA GUIDE, supra note 107, at 53-54 (describing jurisdictional
requircmcnts); see also DEVLLOPIN(, LABOR LAw, supra note 107 (cautioning that the
National Labor Relations Board would only undcrtake action againsLt employers who
met certain jurisdictional amounts).
2013] 723
724 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:706
domestic workers are not included within the enumerated
limitations, and as a result, neither are domestic workers.1 1o9
Consequently, even if the language in the NLRA were tweaked
so that domestic workers were no longer explicitly excluded,
advocates would still have to jump over the NLRB's discretionary
hurdle.IoI Given these considerations, the legislative obstacles on
the federal plane are substantial.
II. EXCLUSION AAD THE ALRA
Despite developments in the international arena, little has
changed in the United States to improve working conditions for
domestic workers. In much the same way domestic workers were
excluded from New Deal protections eighty years ago, they
remain similarly unprotected today.11 The reasons for these
exclusions have been the subject of much scholarship."
This next Part provides a historical analysis of the
development of domestic work in the United States and
discusses two substantive issues that factored prominently into
the legislative debate during the New Deal era. First, it discusses
the emergence of a new social status quo-a new cultural
yardstick that insulated and reshaped the home arena into a
private sphere that legislators felt was unsuitable for external
regulation."is Second, it explains that the emerging middle class
affected the domestic work industry through the proliferation
and reinforcement of an idea that household work had no
109. See NLRA GUIDE supra note 107, at 54 (noting the typical employers who
were able to satisfy the jurisdictional amount); see also DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra
note 107 (setting different jurisdictional amounts for different employers).
110. See NLRA GUIDE, supra note 107, at 54 (delimiting the discretionary
jurisdictional minimrnus that complement the statutory hurdle contained within §
152(3)).
111. See Alen supra note 75. at 58-59 (explaining that over half a century later,
the federal statute still has not recognized those rights for domestic workers, though it
has for other workers); see also THE HAITS AND THE H-Aw-NOTS, supra note 75
(explaining that the exemptions contained within both federal and state legislation
continue).
112. See, e.g., Smith, Organizing the norganizabIe, supra note 4 (positing solutions
to the NLRA domestic worker exemption); Reyna Ramolcte Hayashi, Empowering
Domestic 1orkers Through Law and Or!ganiing Initiati e, 9 SEATTLE . SOc. j sT. 487
(2010) (describing problems that arose from the NLRA exemption).
113. See infra Part I.A (discussing a perception of separate spheres that
contributed toward legislative exclusion for domestic workers).
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productive, economic value. 14 In all, considerations of gender
played a tacit but pervasive role in an industry that has
historically been cast away from certain legislative protections.
A. The Private Sphere in a New "Social Status Quo"
To understand why the sharp divisions along gender lines
still persist within the domestic worker industry today, it is
helpful to examine how the history of domestic workers in the
United States contributed to the current legislative debate. To
start, the conceptualization of the home began to change in the
decades following the Civil War. " Feeding off the growing
prosperity of a bustling industrial economy in the North and a
bountiful agricultural economy in the South, the United States
began to witness the emergence of a new class of citizens.11
Specifically, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
saw the creation and expansion of a new middle class." 7 Families
who had previously been required to tend to their own homes
were, for the first time ever, finding themselves in a position to
hire out that work to others vis-A-vis remunerated domestic
work.118 This prosperity eventually led to a regime where certain
groups of individuals were relegated to the "lowest rung of
legitimate employment.""' Growing household wealth was, in
sum, a necessary contributing factor, since the rising prosperity
that catapulted antebellum American families into an emerging
middle class finally allowed them to afford domestic help.
114. See infra Part II. B (detailing the legislative effect created by the perception of
houschold work as non-cconomrically productive work).
115. See FAYE E. DUDDEN, SERVING VOMEN: HOUSLHOLD SER\VICL IN NINETEENTH
CENTU RY AMERICA 104 (1983) (describing a changing socioeconomic trend in the
American fabric).
116. See DUDDEN, supra note 115, at 107 (analyzing the social phenomenon of an
emerging middle class in the United States); RUSSEii IY\FS, THE DOMESTICATED
AMERICANS 163 (1963) (noting the growth of the middle class); Katharine Silbaugh,
Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. RLV. 1, 22-23 (1996)
(describing the inception of the American middle class).
117. See DUDDEN, supra not 115, at 108 (noting a shifting social landscape); see
LYNLS, supra note 116, at 163 (explaining the emergence of an American middic class).
118. See DUDDEN, supra note 1 15, at 108 (identifying household wealth as a
catalyst for domestic labor); LYNES, supra note 116, at 163-64 (clucidating that greater
household wealth led to familics' abilities to hire out houschold labor).
119. GLENN, supra note 11, at 165.
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This new "social status quo" that accompanied the new
norms of middle class American life rested at the forefront of
the movement toward hired hands within the home.120 Hiring
domestic work became the end goal itself because it symbolized
a socioeconomic separation from the lower class.' 2 It was a
status symbol, and so prevalent was this conceptualization of the
new bourgeois that middle-class families began to consider a
domestic worker within the home as a hallmark that legitimized
their entrance into a new, distinct, and elevated class.j22
The effect that this new social status quo had on the
household was fundamentally transformative. Far from the
setting of spartan functionality as it was previously, the American
home became the epicenter of creature comforts.23 It opposed
the harsh capitalist environment that lay beyond its doors and
demanded an absence of economic activity altogether. 124 The
120. See DU TEN, supra note 115, at 108 (identifying that the new middle class
lifestyle accompanied higher standards of living); see also Smith, Regulating Paid
Household Work, supra note 12, at 861-62 (identifying the standards of a "new
bourgeoisie").
121. See JUDITH ROLLINS, BETWEEN WOMEN: DOMESTICS AN) THEIR EMPLOYEES 35
(1985) (noting that the mistress's use of domestic worker labor within the household
itself symbolized class separation); see also Smith, Regulating Paid Household 1ork, supra
note 12, at 861-62 (explaining that rising houschold wealth spurred the emergence of
a separate social class that adopted, inter alia, domestic help partly as a status Symbol
distinguishing it from the lower class).
122. See RoiLINS, supra note 121, at 104-06 (discussing that white women saw
scrvants within the houschold as confirmation of a middle class social status); see also
Smith, Regulating Paid Household Work, supra note 12, at 861-62 (arguing that
houscholds that hired a domestic worker validated the middle class's entrance into a
higher sociocconomic group).
123. See Smith, RegulatingPaid Household Work, supra note 12, at 900 ("In the pre-
industrial cra, agrarian-centered households served as the primary site of economic
activity, encompassing a diverse range of tasks from the making of bread and the
spinning of textiles for clothes, to the harvesting of food items and the transformation
of leather into shoes."); see also Silbaugh, supra note 116, at 22 ("Before the Industrial
Revolution, most production was home-based; small farning existence and cottage
industry fueled by both men's and women's labor sustained most American families.
Though scx-scgre gation was not unusual in household productive tasks, both men and
women met the material needs of the family in the same way: through production for
private consumption without exchanging labor for wages.").
124. See CHRISTOPHER LASCH. HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY
BESIEGED 6 (1977) (identifying that the household was a private sphere); Silbaugh,
supra note I16, at 22 (explicating that societal norms viewed the home as unsuitable for
capitalistic endeavors); see also NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS 01 NVOMANHOOD:
"WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEw ENGLAND, 1780-1835. at 64 (1977) (contrasting the private
household sphere with the sphere outside the home).
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home setting was a haven in which business and markets had no
role. 125 Families adopted a requisite set of characteristics to
attain this ideal of the home as a safe and sterile sanctuarv1 26 that
included standards concerning, for instance, cleanliness and
cooking. 7 In turn, the demands of middle class living exacted a
considerable toll on the new bourgeois housewife. 1 Caught
between the competing demands of traditional responsibilities
and the high standards of the new social status quo, housewives
found themselves playing roles that were both burdensome and
inconsistent.' While the social norms at the time commanded
husbands to venture forth from the home to wrestle the day-to-
day of business and industry, for wives, it was to care for the
family and to maintain the home in his absence.I1o Refining the
appearance of the household required the housewife to exude
the notions of purity and delicacy inconsistent with the vision of
her soiling her own hands.' ' Thus, looking to domestic work
was a fitting solution because it served the dual function of
easing the burden on women's domestic responsibilities, while
125. See Silbaugh, supra note 1i16, at 22 (articulating that economic activity was
unsuitable in the home); see also LASCH, supra note 124, at 6 (noting the new middle
class household was "an emotional reluge in a cold and competitive society").
126. See DUDDEN, supra note 115, at 135-54 (describing the hallmarks of a new
socio-econonic class); see also Frances E. Olsen, The Famnil and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Lgal Reform, 96 HARV. L REV. 1497, 1504 (1983) (explaining that the
home was the "sanctuary of privacy into which one can retreat").
127. See generally LYDIA RAY BALDERSTON, HOUSEWIFERY: A MANUAL AND TEXT
BOOK OF PRACTICAl. HOUSEKEEPING 240-317 (Benjamin R. Andrews ed., 1924)
(identifying the standards that were required for the new American middic class); see
also DUDDEN, supra note 115, at 109 (listing the number and variation of the new
middle class).
128. See PHI-wIis M. PALMER, DOMESTICITY AND DIRT: HOUSEWIVES AND DOMESTIC
SERVANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1930-1945, at 138 (1989) (describing the competing
demands placed upon the middle class housewife); Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and
Patriarchy in the Meaning ofMotherhood, 1 AM. U.J. GENDER & I 1, 16-17 (1993) (noting
that those demands were at times Contradictory).
129. See PAMER, supra note 128, at 138 (1989) (describing how housework is
often dirty and therefore, inconsistent with the idealized housewife who is pure);
Roberts, supra note 128, at 16-17.
130. See GLENN, supra note 11, at 146 (noting the physical rigor in routine tasks
for a domestic worker); see also Roberts, supra note 128, at 16-24 (asserting that a
woman's role in the middle class household was relegated to the home).
131. See PALMER, supra note 128, at 138 (explaining that women associated with
dirt were of a diminished social status): see also CHRISTINE STANSELL, CITY OF WOMEN:
SLX AND CLASS IN NEWYORK, 1789-1860. at 159 (1987) (" [B]cing a lady meant ... not
doing certain kinds of housework.").
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also separating the middle-class housewife ideal from work
associated With filth and degradation. 32 It is not surprising,
then, that, given the ever-increasing demands of bourgeois
domesticity, wives looked toward domestic workers to keep step
with the requirements of middle-class living.
These historical considerations suggest that the stride
toward domesticating the home was, from the very beginning,
an assertion of the house as a private sphere that was
appropriate for female labor only.'33 The feverish pitch of that
sentiment was no better reflected than in Bradwell v. Illinois,
involving a woman and her attempt to secure a license to
practice law. 34 The Illinois Supreme Court in 1869 refused to
grant Myra Bradwell a law license on the basis of her gender.1 1
In his opinion, Justice Lawrence urged Ms. Bradwell to
reexamine her professional decisions, as the "hot strifes of the
bar, in the presence of the public, and with momentous verdicts
the prizes of the struggle, . . . [might] tend to destroy the
deference and delicacy with which it is the pride of [the] ruder
sex to treat her."1 6 On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, Justice Bradley wrote in concurrence, with whom Justices
Swayne and Fieldjoined, that:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always
recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and
destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's
protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity
132. See PALMER, supra note 128, at 138 (describing an economic force that
pushed middle-class households toward hired domestic help); see also ROLLINS, supra
note 121, at 200 ("[T]he female employer preferred the presence of another woman
whose appearance, as well as other attributes, was inferior to her own."); Barbara
Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood, 18 AM. Q 151, 153 (1966) (explaining that "truc
womanhood" dictated housewivr es to abstain forn menial task such as chores). See
generally Smith, Regulating Paid Household Work. supra note 12.
133. Kristi L. Graunkc, Just Like One of the Famil": Domestic Violence Paradigns and
Combating On-the-fob Violence Against Household Worker in th U nited States, 9 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 131, 149 (2002) (explaining that " [r]ationales surrounding privacy and
sanctity of the home were key in justifying the continued exclusion of domestic workers
from protective labor and employment regulation").
134. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 142 (1873) (deciding that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not create a right for a woman
to obtain a license to practice law in the state).
135. In re Bradwell, 55 111. 535, 542 (1869) (rejecting the appellant's suit for
equitable relief).
136. I.
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and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in
the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things,
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood.'
Justice Bradley's reflection on gender roles serves as just one
prominent example illustrating the idea that the home setting
was both physically and ideologically distinct from the outside
world. 8
Several courts echoed the Bradwell sentiment and were
wont to recognize the home as a private sphere where they were
reluctant to intrude. 139 One of the earlier cases explicitly
recognizing this distinction was State v. Cooper, where the court
explained that the:
[H]ome [was] not an industrial or a business enterprise;
nor [was] it acquired or maintained for pecuniary gain or
profit; but [was], rather, an institution used and maintained
as a place of abode . . . . [The home was the] abiding
place of the affections, esp. [sic] domestic affections; as
[t]he social unit formed by a family residing together in one
dwelling, and as an organized center of family life..140
The Court was persuaded that its decision should take into
consideration the special function of the home setting.141
Indeed, Cooper seemed to borrow from the idea set forth by
the National Recovery Administration ("NRA"), the New Deal
agency tasked to regulate economic competition within the
domestic market. General Hugh Johnson of the NRA wrote,
"Ever since the establishment of this [NRA] administration, we
have received numerous communications concerning the status
of household help. While we are in full sympathy, there is no
possible way we can take direct action in their behalf. The
homes of individual citizens cannot be made the subject of
137. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
138. See supra Part II.A.
139. See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 285 N.W. 903 (Minn. 1939) (distinguishing betwCen
two separate realms where one was inside the home and the other was outside, and
refusing to extend statutory protections in part on this basis).
140. Id. at 903-05 (internal quotation marks onited).
141. Id. at 905.
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regulations or restrictions." 142 These historical antecedents
illustrate a sharp separation of the American lifestyle into two
distinct spheres: the public sphere outside of the home where
the abrasiveness of industry was fit only for male gruffness and
bravado, and the private sphere inside the home that was
amenable to the delicacies of womanhood of the new social
status quo.14s
B. Housework as Aonproductive Work
During the New Deal era, housework was generally
perceived as lacking economic, or productive value. This
perception marginalized household work and presumed that
household work did not deserve legislative protection. 144 The
origin of this idea grew concurrently out of the evolving class
and gender norms during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. As discussed above, the post-Industrial
period was a radically transformative time in the history of the
American family. 143 This cultural transformation cultivated a
142. PAL MER, supra note 128, at 120 (quoting Letter forn A.R. Forbush,
Correspondence Division, to Eva Bulkely (Jan. 31, 1934) (on file with the federal
government at NA RG9, Metal File 622. Box 65)).
I43 Se generally Susan G. Ridgeway, Loss of Consortium and Loss oj Services: A Legacy
of Separate Spheres, 50 MONT. L. REv. 349 (1989) (describing the division between the
home setting and the industrial setting); see also Welter, supra note 132 (expounding in
great detail upon the "separate spheres" idea and its use to reinforce values that
women were pure, submissive, and domestic).
144. See Silbaugh supra note 116, at 22-24 (1996) (noting that women's work was
rnarginalized and relegated to the household); see generally Erna Magnus, The Social,
Economic, and Legal Conditions of Domestic Servants, 30 INT'l LAB. REV. 190 (1934)
(marking the gendered distinction between malc and female work).
145. See supra Part II.A. Rising household wvealth created the beginnings of a new
social status quo vis-a -vis a new middit class. Id. In turn, that new middit class took steps
to assert itself as both socially and ideologically distinct from the lower class by
recalibrating the function of the home and the housewife's responsibility within it. Id.
Much of the impetus came from within the home, as famiics' entrances into the
middit class exerted a pressure to excise any traces of industry from the domestic
sphere. See Smith, Regulating Paid Household Work, supra note 12, at 862 (noting that the
entrance into the American middit class required adherence to certain social and
cultural norms, not the least of which included the upkeep and maintenance of the
household: "[f]or almost every standard imaginable-frorn personal hygiene and
silveiare polishing to the dangers of house dust-thtre was an expert on the subject
and a manual advising housewives how best to refine the private sphere in conformity
with the tenets of capitalist bourgeoisie").
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perception of housework as lacking economic value.1Th As the
Supreme Court of Iowa concluded in 1927, there was "no
tangible, commercial product of domestic service, [since] it
minister[ed] only to the necessity, comfort, and convenience of
the employer."' 4 7 Raising children, cooking, cleaning, and the
general tasks of homemaking were placed fully within the roles
and responsibilities of the middle-class housewife or her
domestic worker.148 But the public did not perceive such work as
"real" work, in the way that the coal miner was elicited this
image: blackened and sullied, for example, from working a ten-
hour shift forty feet underground.149 Because it did not "smack
of industrialism," legislators were reluctant to view it as the kind
of work that deserved their scrutiny.15o
Though it is a much different time now, the formulation of
the home as both socially and ideologically unique still endures
nearly eighty years later. The statutory provisions of the NLRA
remain unchanged today. 151 They still exempt household
domestic workers from protections that are afforded to more
than three-quarters of the US workforce.15 And though not as
overt as Bradley's reflection in Bradwell, evidence of this notion
regarding the unique status of housework still appears in
matters relating to women's obligations within the home.
In 1968, for example, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
ruled on the question of whether a wife could enter into a
contract with her husband for the value of housework she
contributed toward the family. ' The court held that the
contract was unenforceable because it was against public
146. See Silbaugh, supra note I 16, at 22-26 (explaining that prevailing norms
transformed the way society viewed household work); see also Smith, Regulating Paid
Household Work supra note 12, at 898-901 (identifying that in particular, household
work did not carry economic value in the way work outside the home did).
147. Tunnicliff v. Bettendorf, 214 N.W. 516. 518 (Iowa 1927).
148. See Silbaugh, supra note I 16, at 22-26 (describing the public perception of
housework).
149. See Smith, Regulating Paid Household Work, supra note 12. at 898-901.
150. See id. at 893 (explaining that the perception of domestic work was one of the
root reasons for legislative stagnation): see also I.M. Rubinow, Household Service as a
Labor Problem, 3j. HOME ECON. 131. 133-35 (1911).
151. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
152. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text (explaining the limitations of
the NLRA's reach).
153. Matthews v. Matthews, 162 S.E.2d 697, 698 (N.C. Ct. App. 1968).
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policy.lA Moreover, it elaborated that in any case, the contract
lacked consideration because the contractual terms
notwithstanding, "a husband has the right to the service of his
wife as a wife, and this includes his right to her society and her
performance of her household and domestic duties."155
Later, in 1973, the Georgia Court of Appeals made a similar
assertion in holding that a husband was entitled to the work his
wife put toward "ordinary household duties," such as cooking
and cleaning. 166 These cases reflected the sentiment that
household work did not deserve recognition as having its own
independent economic value.
As recently as 1994, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
confronted the issue of whether housework and caring for
children could be considered "employment" for the purpose of
granting work-release privileges in the appellant's home in lieu
of a ninety-day prison sentence.' 7 The appellant argued that
housework should be considered employment because she
would be paid an hourly wage, and her work provided a tangible
benefit to the household 158 She further argued that there
should not be a distinction between her role as a housewife and
that of a hired domestic worker.'15 In denying her relief, the
Court stressed the importance of the home setting. It stated that
the home was "a sacred place for people to go and be quiet and
at rest and not be bothered with the turmoil of industry, and
that as such it [was] a sanctuary of the individual and should not
be interfered with by industrial disputes." 160 Though the
appellant's work contract would have been valid "employment"
in any other setting, in the home, it was not.
In opposition, scholar Selma James was one of the first
prominent individuals to raise the counterpoint. lb Women's
154. Id. at 699 (refusing to enforce the contract).
155. Id. at 698.
156. Dep't of Human Res. v. Williams, 202 S.E.2d 504, 507 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973).
157. State v. Bachiann, 521 NW.2d 886. 887 (Minn. CL. App. 1994).
158. Id. (noting that plaintiffs husband agreed to pay her US$1.50 per hour to
care for her four children and perform other homemaking services).
159. Id. at 887-88 (arguing that because her work within the household was paid,
it was similar in character to domestic work).
160. Id. at 888 (quotations omitted).
161. See generally SELMAJAMES, THE POWER OFW XOMEN AND THE SUBVERSION OF
COMMUNITY (1972) (arguing tLha houschold work indeed held inhertci productive
value).
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unpaid labor, she argued, was societal action that
misappropriated women's capital contributions. 162 Such labor,
notwithstanding its domestic character, was "crucial to the
functioning of the capitalist system, []should be recognized as
part of the base chain of productivity, and [should] receive
monetary reward."161
This same idea has resonated in other areas of law. In a tort
action for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court echoed
James' position when it rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiff who filed suit to claim against her insurance company
for non-payment.164 There, the claimant suffered a debilitating
injury from an automobile accident and sought to recover for
her inability to perform household work. 16 The insurance
company tried to limit its liabilities by arguing that such work
was not compensable. '66 The Court, however, disagreed and
explained that her inability to perform housework and care for
her family "most definitely result [ed] in an economic loss to the
family unit." 7
In still other areas of the law, the sentiment that female
labor lacked economic contribution seems to have fallen out of
favor. In matrimonial proceedings, for example, some courts
have moved away from factoring in only monetary contributions
when reaching equitable asset settlements between disputing
parties. In Haugan v. Haugan, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
interpreted its state divorce statute to include a consideration of
all factors in order to arrive at an equitable remedy. 168 To this
end, the Court took into account the wife's contributions as
homemaker and mother during the period of the couple's
marriage.16' Similarly in Simmons v. Simmons, the Connecticut
162. See id. at 16-17 (arguing that reiusing to recognize the economic value
inherent in household work was disingenuous to wonen's true contributions to an
overall productive economLy).
163. JANET FILOY) & LAUREL FORSTER, THE RECIPE READER: NARRTAIVES,
CONTEXTS, TRADITIONS 160 (2003).
164. Rindahl v. Nat'1 Farmers Union Ins., 373 N.W.2d 294. 297 (1985) (involving a
personal injury for which the claimant sought to recover front pay).
165. Id. at 295-96 (detailing the economic injuries that the claimant suffered as a
result of her accident).
166. Id. at 296-97 (presenting the insurance company's defense).
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Haugan v. Haugan, 343 N.W.2d 796. 800-03 (Wis. 1984).
169. Id. at 805.
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Supreme Court considered the wife's supportive role in the
home in reaching an equitable settlement between her and her
husband. 170 These courts recognized that household
contributions were not captured simply in wages, and as a result,
such wage-only accounting is disingenuous and often results in a
windfall for one party at the expense of the other. Rather, they
recognized that any accurate accounting should also include the
value that accrues from non-monetary sources. In this case, it is
through a homemaker's labor contributions. Recalibrating the
factors that contribute to a household's productive output, these
courts recognized that domestic work held inherent economic
value.
III. DOMESTIC WORKERS: WHAT LIES AHEAD
This Note argues that the rationale that courts and
legislators relied upon to exclude domestic workers from New
Deal protections is undeniably inappropriate today, and
continued reliance on those justifications perpetuates a line of
reasoning that was questionable even eighty years ago. The two
complementary ideas discussed above are at odds with actions
that legislatures have subsequently taken in regulating separate,
but similar, areas of the law. First, this Part looks critically toward
the justifications for creating and upholding these legislative
exclusions. 171 Second, it evaluates the potential for change
through the recent ILO Convention.172
A. A Troubling Legacy
The argument that legislatures simply could not enact
statutes like the NLRA to regulate the domestic services industry
because it would intrude upon the private sphere of the home is
not persuasive. 1" This is because legislatures across the country
had, during the same time of the NLRA's passage, already found
it fitting to journey well into this arena.
170. Simmons v. Simmons, 708 A.2d 949, 960 (Conn. 1998).
171. See infra Part 11l.A.
172. See infra Part 11I.B.
173. See supra Part I.A (explaining that Lhe justifications sc[ forth to preserve the
exclusion are contradicted by other pieces of legislation enacted at the sane time).
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First, for example, they had little problem regulating the
private sphere through the use of decency laws. For example,
during the time of the NLRA's passage, every single state had
anti-sodomy laws on its books regulating the kinds of sexual acts
were appropriate within the privacy of the bedroom.174 This
legislative intrusion continued until 1961, when Illinois became
the first state to adopt recommendations to abolish consensual
sodomy from its criminal code. 175 Even then, though,
legislatures were slow to remove themselves from the private
sphere. It was not until another forty years later that the
remaining states followed suit after the Supreme Court in
Lawrence v. Texas struck down such decency laws as
unconstitutional. 176
In sum, state and local governments have declined to
legislate into the home to protect domestic workers, but yet
found it appropriate to do so to regulate intimate human
conduct. 77 If privacy were the yardstick that determined
whether regulation would be appropriate, arguably few settings
are more private than one's bedroom, and few acts more private
than those that occur within it.18 It took over sixty years before
anti-sodomy laws were struck down as unconstitutional.17 It is a
curious facet of the legal system that finds that the employment
relationship between a domestic worker and her employer falls
too far within the private setting of the home to escape
regulation, but a consensual sexual relationship in the bedroom
does not.
Second, legislatures have found it fitting to legislate into
the home in cases of domestic violence, but not for abuses
within the domestic services industry, even though patterns of
174. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (noting that although the American Law Institute revised the Model Penal
Code in 1955 with amended language that "made clear that it did not recommend or
provide for criminal penalties for consensual sexual relations conducted in private,"
these changes were not adopted by any state until 1961).
175. And arguably even later, until 1962, since the statute did not comie into effect
until a year after its adoption. See id. (describing the progress of state legislatures in
abolishing consensual sodomy prohibitions).
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. See id. (noting the slow kegislative and judicial movement toward banning
such decenc laws).
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abuse in both settings are remarkably similar.180 Laws specifically
intended to promote safe and fair labor practices continue to
single out and exclude domestic workers.181 The result is lax
enforcement of existing criminal statutes and high incidences of
abuse within the industry.,2
By the late twentieth century, many state and national laws
had ventured into the home to criminalize spousal abuse and
domestic violence. Scholar Kristi Graunke pointed to the kinds
of abuse within the household work industry and how
remarkably similar they were to incidents of domestic
violence.18 1 For this reason, she argues, there should be lesser
legislative resistance to regulate the employment relationships
that exist within household services.184 The patterns of abuse
and mistreatment in domestic violence cases are very similar to
those that domestic workers also experience. First, the
household employer commonly exploits the dependency that
grows between the domestic worker and the employer.',5 The
dependency oftentimes manifests itself, for example, in the form
of the employer withholding work visas, passports, or plane
tickets home. 186 Other times, it could be less explicit, in that the
domestic worker may feel herself dependent on her employer's
sponsorship for eventual legal immigrant status. 187 Second,
employer abuses against domestic workers often use isolation as
a mechanism to exert power and control.188 Such isolation could
be physical, but more often it is psychological. 189 Third, both
180. See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text (introducing the similarities
between abuses within the domestic services industry and those between domestic
partners).
181. See supra Part LC (noting the exclusion within the NLRA).
182. See id. (detailing pattCrns of abuse within the domestic services industry).
183. See Graunke, supra note 133, at 156-60.
184. Id. at 178.
185. Id. at 158.
186. United States v. Sanga, 967 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1992) (illustrating an
example of severe domestic worker abuse within the cmployer-einployce relationship).
187. Id. at 1334-35 (describing how the employer stoic the domestic worker's
return air ticket and passport).
188. See Graunke, supra note 133, at 160-63.
189. See Bought and Sold (NBC News Television Broadcast, Mar. 18, 2001); see also
joAnn Grbach, Gaithersbag Wan Sente ed for Enslaving Br I .lia Woman, (AZETTE
(Gaithersburg, Md.) (Aug. 16. 2000), http://www.gazette.net/20033 /gaitheirsburg/
ncws/22199-1.tmi (last visited Nov. 5, 2011) (discussing a livc-in worker who was
unpaid).
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incidents of abuse share a constant physical proximity between
the victim and the abuser.19 1o Scholars point to the common
patterns shared between domestic abuse and abuse within the
domestic worker industry as an opportunity for legislators to
reconsider the exclusions barring domestic workers from
coverage.
Further, the view that domestic work lacks economic value
and as such is not deserving of legislative protections is equally
troublesome. Discussed above, this view grew out of a perception
that because it occurred within the home, it did not share
"industrial" qualities that would meaningfully contribute to a
productive economy. 'Y Justifications that deny domestic workers
labor protections rest on ideas that their labor contributes little,
if at all, to a productive society.192 However, the law should be
even more willing to recognize productive value in the domestic
worker industry because the work there is couched in an
employer-employee relationship, rather than a marital one.'9
General housekeeping work certainly has economic value, and
society owes it an accounting for its contribution toward a
prosperous economy.1 94 One need not venture far to recognize
that even without payrolls or punch cards, raising children and
keeping the home confers a tangible benefit to those who live
within it.
A smattering of recent decisions seem to indicate a
changing tide in this view. Rindahl v. National Farmers Insurance,
Haughn v. Haughn, and Simmons v. Simmons are just a few
examples of a judicial shift toward recognizing the inherent
190. See Graunke, supra note 133, at 163-71.
191. See supra Part II.B (discussing the perception that household-related labor
was non-cconomnical).
192. Id. (explaining the economic value placed on household wvork).
193. Id. (describing areas in which household work was seen as non-cconornical,
conmonly found in the marital setting, much kss in the employment setting).
194. Ann Chadeau, 1What is Households' Non-Mariket Production Worth?, 18 OECD
ECON. STUD. 85, 97 (1992) (estimating that the economic value of household work in
the United States ranges from thirty-two to sixty percent of the national economy); see
also UNITED NATIONS L)EV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1995, at 97
(1995), available at http://hdIr.undp.org/cn/reports/global/hdilrl995/cihapters
(reporting that women's unpaid labor at is valued at US$11 trillion worldwide, out of a
global economy wvorth US$39 trillion).
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value in household work.19 But statutory protections such as the
NLRA remain meager. 100' Whatever monetary value may be
placed upon the work, courts are beginning to evidence a
willingness to recognize that household work does indeed have
economic value.
B. An International Solution?
Most recently, the United States' movement toward official
support of the ILO Convention on Domestic Workers is
undeniably a positive step in granting domestic workers
unionizing protections. But, without more, it is mostly symbolic.
As an instrument to erode the exemptions present in the NLRA,
the Convention will have to dodge a number of obstacles, any of
which could potentially render the Convention unviable.
Potential movement in the international arena seems to
undergird the sense that equal protections might eventually
become available for millions of domestic workers around the
world.197 However, the unique treatment that the United States
gives to international law presents a significant obstacle toward
enacting comprehensive legislative protections. The US Senate
may use a common treaty device, the reservation, to render
Article 3 of the Convention unenforceable to the extent that it
ran counter to the NLRA. 198 Article A3 (2) (a) of the Convention
grants domestic workers the freedom to associate with others,
including the "effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining."' 9 If a declaration were attached to it such that, for
instance, any portion of it that conflicted with federal statutes
would be rendered null and void, A3(2) (a) would then become
195. See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text (discussing limited instances
where courts recognized an inherent economic value in household wvork).
196. See supra Part I.C (reporting the legislative vacuum in this area of law for
domnestic workers).
197. See supra Part I.B (discussing both the ICCPR and the Convention as
potential vehicles to provide domestic worker protections in the United States).
198. RLSTATLMLNT (THIRD) OF FoRLI(,N RLLATIONS LAW OF THL US § 313 (1987)
(explaining the legal iunction of a treaty reservation) [hereinafter RESTATFMFNT
(THIRD) OF FORLIGN RELATIONS]; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatics,
art. 21, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (declaring
that a reservation "modifies for the reserving State in its relations wvith that other party
the provisions of the treaty to which the reservation relatcs to the extent of the
rescrvation").
199. See Domestic Worker Convention, supra note 50, art. 3(2) (a).
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unenforceable within the domestic sphere as a result.20 The
possibility of such declarations to potentially attach to the
Convention is a significant one because even if the Convention
were able to move through the ratification process relatively
unaltered (an unlikely situation), a simple declaration such as
the one described above could close this avenue completely for
greater unionization protections for domestic workers. 01
Moreover, the United States has the ability to place the
same kind of declaration that it had on the ICCPR-a non self-
executing clause that limits domestic applicability of the
Convention in the absence of express Congressional
authorization. 202 This is significant because even if the
Convention is able to successfully navigate past the appropriate
legislative hurdles, the United States may nevertheless place a
self-executing clause in it, which would render it inapplicable in
a domestic setting. Domestic workers in the United States would
then still not be able to take advantage of the treaty through
private rights of actions for household employer violations of
it.20s Assuming that Congress had expressly authorized the treaty
to apply domestically, there could still be potential problems
relating to the other types of declarations that could attach to
the Convention.
Optimistically, though, there appears to be a growing
movement that is campaigning for greater labor protections for
domestic workers. Organizations like Domestic Workers United
in New York, Mujeres Unidas y Activas in San Francisco, CASA
de Maryland in Washington, D.C., and the Florida Immigrant
Advocacy Center in Miami have lobbied vehemently to get
union protections on the books for domestic workers. 204 In 2010,
200. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RETATIONS, supra note 198, § 313
(discussing treaty rescvatiLons as a procedural device); see also Vienna Convention,
supra note 198, art. 21 (explaining the implications of reservations placed on a treaty).
201. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONs, supra note 198, § 313.
202. See id.
203. See RLSTATLMLNT (THIRD) OF' FORLIG)N RELATIONS, supra note 198, § 313
(explaining the significance of Senate reservations placed on a treaty despite its
ratification).
204. See generally CASA DE MARYLAND, http://wwW.casademaryland.org (last
visited Oct. 24, 2012) (lobbying for local legislation to protect domestic workers in the
Washington, D.C. metiropolitan area); DOMLSTIC VORKERS UNITED.
ttp://www. domesticworkersuli[ted.org/index.php/cn/ouIr-work/ campaigns (last
visited Oct. 24, 2012) (pushing for an greater set of minimum protections for New York
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New York State became the first state in the country to adopt a
comprehensive set of rights aimed specifically at the State's
nannies, maids, children's caregivers, cooks, and the like. 20s
Even so, it fell short of filling in the NLRA exclusion to confer
unionizing protections to domestic workers.2on Instead, the State
created an exploratory committee to determine strategies for
domestic worker unionization, with the possibility of revisiting
the issue in the future.207 A separate campaign in California also
tried to enact a similar piece of legislation to set workplace
regulations within the home. Though the campaign was not
successful, advocacy groups in California continue to lobby for
increased domestic worker protections. os In so doing, they join
sister campaigns across the country that are trying to remove
from the national consciousness a long-standing but misguided
notion that household work is somehow less deserving of
legislative protections.
CONCLUSION
The movement toward overturning NLRA exclusions is
slow, but the gradual trend might not be too surprising given
the historical legislative pedigree for domestic worker labor in
this country. Yet as some courts are now recognizing, the reasons
to exclude domestic workers from labor protections are mired
in inadequate and anachronistic notions of gender roles in this
country. Whatever relevance such a line of reasoning might have
had eighty years ago during the NLRA's passage, that reasoning
is unsatisfying today and is an insufficient justification for either
City domestic workers); FLA. IMMIGRANT ADVOCACY CTR., http://aijustice.org/policy-
advocacy (last visited Oct. 18, 2012) (campaigning for worker rights in Miami); ML-FRFS
UNIDAS Y ACTIVAS, I http://wwW.mujeresunidas.net/cnglish/comimunity/
community.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012) (campaigning for a similar set of increased
protections).
205. Domestic 'Workers Bill of Rights Act. A. 1470-B, 2009 Lcg.. 233d. Sess. (N.Y.
20 10) (noting the passage of the New York State Domestic Worker Bill of Rights).
206. Id. (detailing the limitations of the Domestic Workers Bill of Rights).
207. Id. (noting that while the legislation created many new protections for
domestic workers living in New York, the state legislature kept the option open to
explore bolstering collective bargaining rights).
208. Id. (discussing the difficulties that these campaigns had in bolstering
legislative protections for domestic workers).
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the judiciary or the legislature to deny equal protections to a
group of people that arguably deserves them most.

